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2. Members of the Committee : Mr. Roper (Chairman); 
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Baumel, Bechter (Alternate: Bozzi), van den Bergh, 
Boldrini, Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin, Fosson, Grant, 
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Handlos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, Maggioni, 
Menard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Buchner), Pecchioli, 
Peronnet, Hermann Schmidt (Alternate: Vohrer), Schol-
ten, Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate: Banks). 
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printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on a European armaments policy 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the growing cost of modern armaments technology and current economic trends can lead 
to unilateral disarmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance ; 
Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and 
standardisation of military equipment ; to ensure the survival of a viable European armaments industry ; 
and lastly a. two-way street in armaments with the United States; 
Considering that limited but as yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the 
independent European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, 
and Military Agency for Standardisation, in all of which all WEU countries participate ; 
Believing that only if the European armaments industry as a whole is restructured on a viable and 
competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made ; 
Welcoming the stuay of the European armaments industry being undertaken by the Standing 
Armaments Committee, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and the standardisation of defence 
equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be concentrated in the independent European 
programme group ; 
2. Call for the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European 
Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research ; 
3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be 
made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks ; 
4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its 
activities to the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. There are two vital objectives of the North 
Atlantic Alliance which are subject to chronic 
delays, if not frustration, for lack of effecti>:e 
unity between its European members. One IS 
the standardisation and interoperability of arms 
equipment, the other is the establishment of a 
two-way street between Europe and North Amer-
ica whieh is needed not only to provide a more 
cos't-effective use of resources and increased 
standardisation of weapons systems but also for 
the psychological and political purpose of creat-
ing a better balance in the Alliance between the 
United States and its European allies. These 
frustrations and delays are a great impediment 
to the build-up of the defensive strength of the 
Alliance, which the ever-growing weight of the 
Warsaw. Pact's offensive capability has made 
necessary. 
U. The problems 
2. It is, of course, an essential feature of 
the Atlantic Alliance that it is an association 
of independent, democratic states, within which 
are divergent trends of public opinion, in con-
trast to the political conformity to the l\farxist 
ideology and the control of the CPSU, the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (commonly 
called Russia in the West), which characterise 
the Warsaw Pact. The lack of political unity 
between the NATO countries is reflected in every 
sphere of activity, diplomatic, strategic and 
financial ; and it is an astounding tribute to the 
validity of voluntary co-operation between free 
societies that NATO has held together as well 
as it has for nearly thirty years. But it is in 
the field of arms procurement and manufacture, 
with the rapidly rising costs of weapons, that 
the lack of an jntegrated European programme 
is most marked and its disadvantages most 
evident, both in regard to the Soviet bloc and 
to the industrial and financial strength of the 
United States. 
3. Indeed, if any real'progress is to be made 
along the two-way street in view of the constant 
development and sales-drive of the great Amer-
ican armament corporations, then there is no 
time to lose. Given the time-scale in the design 
and production of weapons systems, decisions 
will have to be taken by 1980 if new equipment 
is to enter service by the nineties. 
4. If no progress is made towards rationalisa-
tion within Europe, large European arms or 
aircraft manufacturers will enter into joint agree-
ments with American companies, such as that 
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already signed between Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm and McDonnell Douglas in September 
1977, with a view to the development of a new 
fighter aircraft. The result of such transcon-
tinental collaboration would be the disappearance 
of the independent European firms from the 
market. The threat that faces the European 
aircraft industry can best be understood when 
we look at the difference between American and 
European civil and military aircraft manu-
facturers. There are nineteen eompanies within 
the European Community as compared to only 
eight in the United States. The nineteen com-
panies have to share a substantially lower 
turnover of 7.4 billion units of account in the 
Community, as against 17.6 billion in the United 
States. This can only mean that both military 
and civil aircraft industries in Europe are badly 
planned from the point of view of competition ; 
their research and development activities overlap 
thus reducing effectiveness ; costs are dispropor-
tionately high, while the benefits of economy of 
scale cannot be exploited. The result is that both 
the civil and military aircraft industries are 
threatened unless military ·procurement policy 
is used to promote increased collaboration across 
national frontiers. 
5. Apart from the danger of American 
dominance of the European armaments indus-
tries, one of the greatest threats that faces the 
western Alliance is the danger of "disarmament 
through inflation". At a time of low economic 
growth, governments are reluctant to direct 
further scarce resources to defence even though 
weapon costs are growing fast and even though 
weapon effectiveness offers Alliance members 
the best hope of counteracting the ever-increasing 
offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact forces. 
Greater efficiency in weapon supply and a 
rationalisation of the equipment procurement 
process are therefore of paramount importance 
for western security. As Elliott R. Goodman has 
written : " ... some observers look hopefully to a 
new arms technology that promises to provide 
inexpensive but extremely effective weapons. 
Their general adoption might make it possible 
for Europe to avoid being priced out of the 
weapons market, while also reducing the United 
States Defence Bill." 1 
6. Mr. Goodman cites the increased accuracy 
of precision-guided munitions and the example 
of their effectiveness in the Arab/Israeli war of 
October 1973 as evidence of the greater cost-
effectiveness of future defensive short-range 
{. Elliott R. Goodman : "The puzzle of European 
defence : the issue of arms procurement", Survey, 
su=er{autumn 1976, page 219. 
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battlefield weapon systems. However, he concedes 
Richard Burt's argument that "both long-range 
and all-weather precision-guided munitions now 
under development will cost far more than pre-
sent generation systems." 1 
Wasted money 
7. .Another unhappy consequence of the 
separate national procurement and production 
of land, sea and air armaments, which tend to 
be increasingly sophisticated and costly, is the 
duplication of expenditure on research. Thomas 
A. Callaghan, the "doyen" of writers on this 
subject, estimates that in 1974 Europe spent 
$2.5 billion on research and development, while 
the United States spent $7.6 billion. As the 
United States research and development pro-
gramme duplicated virtually all European pro-
jects and included much else besides, the Alliance 
as a whole could save $2.5 billion if research 
and development projects were shared equitably 
between Europe and the United States instead 
of being duplicated. Nor is there any evidence 
to suggest that the overlap in research and 
development between the European countries 
themselves is any less than that between the 
European allies of the United States. One has 
only to count up the different types of weapons 
with the same functions in use today with the 
armed forces of the European members of the 
Alliance to have some vivid idea of the waste 
involved. It is not simply a matter of the 
procurement of non-standardised equipment, 
manufactured in different countries on a small 
scale - the training of operating and main-
tenance personnel, and the setting up of repair 
and maintenance facilities will be far more 
expensive as well. 
8. Thus we can only conclude that if national 
defence budgets are taken as a yardstick, coun-
tries are getting too little defence for their 
money, or, if existing capabilities are used as a 
yardstick, countries are paying too much for 
what they are getting. The present policies of 
the European allies entail an unwarrantable 
waste of resources, which, if properly used, 
would amount to a policy of European rearma-
ment. Up till now, the problem of producing 
standardised military material and reducing 
duplication has been seen as one of achieving 
specific objectives of defence policy. This has 
been due to the fact that discussion has taken 
place within organisations chiefly concerned with 
defence, e.g. Eurogroup, ·wEU and most recently 
the independent European programme group. 
9. In other words, the new weapons techno-
logy heightens the advantages which the United 
States already possesses of greater resources for 
1. R. Burt: "New weapons technologies and European 
security", Orbis, summer 1975, page 256. 
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research and development and longer production 
runs. The European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance would without countervailing measures 
be even more likely to increase their dependence 
on the United States, thereby perpetuating the 
imbalance in the arms trade between Western 
Europe and the United States. 
Tke European defence equipment market 
10. The manufacture and procurement of air-
craft, though the most costly, is, of course, only 
part of the whole operation of supplying the 
manifold defence requirements of the European 
Atlantic allies. They constitute (incLuding France) 
a very substantial market, amounting to nearly 
$40 billion in 1976, compared with the arms 
expenditure of $77 billion of the United States. 
This gives us some idea in financial terms of 
the size of the defence transactions by members 
of the Atlantic Alliance who also constitute the 
whole of the European Community, except Ire-
land. 
11. The following table shows the spending by 
countries which form part of the NATO military 
system on major purchases of equipment as a 
percentage of their overall defence spending, 
and from this we see that the Community coun-
tries for which figures are given spent between 
10 % and 21 % of their 1977 defence budgets 
for this purpose, apart from Luxembourg with 
its very low figure. At the same time, nearly 
all these countries show ·a substantial increase 
for 1977 by comparison with previous years. 
The figures must, however, be viewed with some 
reservation as they only cover major purchases 
of equipment, and it is often difficult to draw 
the line accurately between the purchase of 
equipment and expenditure on buildings and 
installations. In most cases, total spending on 
equipment would be considerably higher than 
indicated in the table. 
12. While American equipment (e.g. computers, 
precision-guided weapons, airborne missiles and 
aircraft) account for a sizable proportion of 
the European non-nuclear weapons market, the 
German Federal Republic, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom are basically self-supporting 
in conventional arms. The other countries in 
the Community are obliged to import most of 
their military requirements. This aggravates the 
present situation in which the equipment of 
their armed forces is not only not standardised 
but for the most part not interoperable either. 
13. Fortunately, there is now not only a 
recognition throughout NATO of the nature of 
the problem, but also a publicly-declared 
determination to achieve overdue reforms in the 
field of weapons procurement which is already 
being translated into concrete action. The prob-
lems in this field have been clearly identified. 
Thomas Callaghan has estimated that weapon 
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Spending on major purchases of equipment as a percentage of total defence expenditure 
1972 1973 
% % 
Belgium 11.4 8.4 
Canada 6.1 7.3 
Denmark 15.4 17.2 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 12.3 12.1 
Italy 16.9 15.2 
Luxembourg 1.5 1.3 
Netherlands 10.7 11.2 
Norway 11.8 11.7 
Portugal 7.5 4.5 
Turkey 4.9 5.0 
United Kingdom. 18.6 19.3 
United States 21.6 18.9 
Source : NATO. 
duplication 1 has cost NATO more than $10 bil-
lion per annum. He believes that the appalling 
waste of manpower, money, energy and materials 
has occurred because NATO has failed to 
achieve: 
(a) common military requirements for 
weapons and equipment through com-
mon tactical doctrine ; 
(b) complementary research and develop-
ment projects through rationalisation 
of development tasks and through 
specialisation in development areas ; 
(c) a diversity of weapon system options 
and hardware through a United States/ 
European technology base and through 
savings in system acquisition and sup-
port practices ; 
(d) larger weapons inventories at lower 
unit cost through rationalisation of 
production sources and through pro-
duction runs of the combined Euro-
pean/ American scale ; 
(e) mutually-supporting general-purpose 
forces through standardisation of 
weapons and equipment and through 
common spares and maintenance 
logistics; 
1. For table on advanced missile duplication, see the 
previous report of the Committee : Document 671. 
Explanatory Memorandum, Chapter V "Production of 
missiles in Europe" and Appendix II (Rapporteur Mr. 
Wall, 29th April 1975) ; see also R. Burt : "New weap-
ons technologies", page 4, Institute for Strategic Stu-
dies, London, 1976. 
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1974 ·1975 1976 1977 
% % % % 
8.8 9.1 11.1 10.3 
5.9 6.3 8.0 9.1 
19.3 19.0 19.4 17.3 
11.9 
15.2 
2.4 
13.2 
13.4 
3.1 
3.0 
17.2 
18.1 
11.8 13.2 13.3 
13.9 13.1 14.0 
1.0 3.4 2.9 
15.6 15.2 18.2 
14.4 13.3 16.6 
1.9 1.9 2.2 
- - -
19.3 20.6 21.8 
17.5 18.5 20.8 
(f) a balanced, collective, conventional 
force deterrent through military, 
technological and industrial interde-
pendence and through marshalling 
available economic .means to achieve 
desired military ends ; 
(g) equitable financial burden-sharing in 
all defence areas through economic 
and technological benefit-sharing ; 
(h) jobs and markets for underemployed 
defence industries through non-
duplicative projects on an Atlantic 
development and production scale and 
through a North Atlantic common 
<;lefence market1. 
Joint production and the arms trade 
14. The cost of modern arms having risen far 
more than the rate of inflation, simple economics 
has obliged some countries to co-operate, mainly 
in the production of military aircraft. The very 
high research and development costs of aircraft, 
such as the Tornado, makes it virtually impos-
sible for a single country to build such aircraft 
on its own. Thus joint production has become 
one obvious solution, and one which, whenever 
possible, NATO has encouraged. The other has 
been to reduce unit costs by selling arms abroad. 
This arms trade has three disadvantages: it 
depends upon the procurement policies of others ; 
it runs the risk of accelerating arms races in 
other continents which may lead towards involv-
1. Thomas A. Callaghan, .Tnr. : "A co=on market for 
Atlantic defence" Survival, May/.Tune 1975, page 129, 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
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ing Europe to its disadvantage, and it subor-
dinates NATO standardisation to the competitive 
interests in the third world. Nevertheless, the 
size of the arms · business makes it such an 
important element both in regard to the balance 
of trade and employment in at least two major 
countries of Western Europe that it could not 
be dispensed with. A survey made by the United 
States Department of Defence shows that in 
1974 France was the largest arms exporter in 
the European Community with total exports 
worth $3 billion, followed by the United Kingdom 
with $1.5 billion, Italy with $0.25 billion and 
the German Federal Republic with $0.18 billion. 
Evidently, the sale of armaments to other coun-
tries is essential to the present structure of the 
French and British arms industries, even if it 
is not an instrument of foreign policy such as 
the United States' export of military aircraft to 
the Middle East. This is not a factor which 
operates in favour of a coherent European arms 
procurement policy. 
Standardisation and interoperability 
15. The notorious inefficiency, which stems 
from the diversity of weapons, ammunition and 
communications systems produced and operated, 
has been denounced for years by NATO's 
supreme commanders and contrasted with the 
advantages of uniformity in the armament of 
the Warsaw Pact. Standardisation and inter-
operability of arms have been under discussion 
virtually since 1949 and in a growing number 
of forums. Many standardisation agreements 
(STANAGs) have been negotiated and, no doubt, 
as the NATO long-term defence programme goes 
into action there will be more, particularly as 
the result of Task Force 7 (electronic warfare) 
and Task Force 8 (rationalisation). But progress 
has been slow and piecemeal. There is, of course, 
no way of removing two of the main causes of 
diversity, the rights of independent states to 
determine their defence policies, of which the 
French is the most extreme example, and the 
competition and vested interests of rival arms 
manufacturers in a free-market economy. All 
must be accomplished by agreement. But there 
can be no question of the urgency of the matter. 
The attainment of interoperability is an absolute 
minimum requirement. Standardisation itself is 
urgently needed not simply from the point of 
view. of cost, but also to achieve proper logistic 
support. Non-standardised but interoperable 
equipment could not, in the event of damage, 
be repaired and supplied with spare parts in 
all allied countries using different types of 
weapons, unless those countries held stocks of 
spare parts, special tools, and, in many cases, 
had specially trained personnel. Interoperable 
but non-standardised equipment would therefore 
become rapidly unusable as a result of minor 
damage in situations where equipment was 
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dependent on an allied country's supply and 
maintenance facilities. 
ID. The approach to solutions 
16. There is broad agreement on both sides 
of the Atlantic that urgent measures are neces. 
sary to rectify these deficiencies and the Alliance 
has acknowledged the principle that there is a 
"need to maJntain a highly developed techno-
logical scientific and industrial base in Europe 
whilst also seeking to achieve the closest possible 
co-operation in arms production and procure-
ment between the countries of North America 
and Europe". This Eurogroup statement of June 
1974 was officially noted by the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee. 
17. The British Secretary of State for Defence 
told the House of Commons on 16th December 
1974 that "there was general agreement- and 
in this I include my colleague the United States 
Defence Secretary - that progress on stand-
ardisation of equipment must involve genuine 
two-way traffic between the European allies 
and the United States". 
18. By May 1975, following the circulation in 
official quarters of the Callaghan report on 
United States/European economic co-operation 
in military and civil technology in late summer 
and autumn 197 4, and following the approval 
by the United States Senate Armed Services 
Committee of the CulverjNunn amendment on 
harmonisation and interdependence between the 
United States of America and Western Europe 
in the field of military equipment, the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee agreed at its 
meeting of 22nd-23rd May 1975 "to pursue 
within the appropriate machinery the establish-
ment of a two-way street between Europe and 
North America in order to provide a more cost-
effective use of resources and increased stan-
dardisation of weapons systems" 1• The then 
United States Secretary for Defence, Mr. Schle-
singer, made it clear in October 1975 that he 
expected the Europeans "to put their own house 
in order, and to make such arrangements as 
would enable them to compete realistically with 
American industry." 2 ' 
19. Western European equipment experts res-
ponsible to the national armaments directors 
examined the collective resources necessary to 
meet the organisational and technical challenge 
to the European arms industries which a genuine 
two-way street on American terms would pre-
sent. The result of their recommendations was 
1 .. NATO communiqu6. 
2. The Alliance and Europe, Part IV - the European 
programme group - D.C.R. Heyhoe, Institute for Stra· 
tegic Studies, London, 1977, page 8. 
the decision of Eurogroup Ministers at their 
meeting in The Hague on 5th November 1975 
"to explore further the potential for extending 
co-operation in European armaments collabora-
tion in an independent forum open to all Euro-
pean members of the Alliance". Having partici-
pated in the meeting of United States, British 
and German Defence Ministers in October 1975 
and the French Mirage F-1 aircraft having lost 
out in the marche du siecle to the General 
Dynamics F-16 for the re-equipment of the 
Norwegian, Danish, Dutch and Belgian air 
forces, the French Government felt more willing 
to participate in a European arms procurement 
organisation which accorded to French strategic 
concepts of independence from the United States 
while offering to French armaments industries 
the benefits of additional economies of scale 
allied to access to useful technological informa-
tion. 
20. Accordingly, a meeting of the Eurogroup 
countries arid France was held in Rome on 
2nd February 1976. The independent European 
programme group (IEPG) 1 which was formed 
at that meeting has proved an invaluable forum 
and workshop for evolving at both a technical 
and political level a European armament policy 
which is independent of Eurogroup and of 
NATO's integrated military structure but which 
nevertheless brings together twelve European 
members of the Alliance (i.e. the Eurogroup 
members plus France) in a way which should 
enable them not only to harmonise their own 
weapon requirements but to adopt a common 
position in transatlantic dialogue with North 
Americans in the field of equipment procure-
ment. In Europe, the work of the IEPG has 
made some progress, while in the United States a 
declared commitment to the two-way street and to 
equipment rationalisation has been maintained. 
In Congress, the House of Representatives Armed 
Services Committee on 24th January 1978 
announced the appointment of a special sub-
committee on NATO standardisation, interopera-
bility and readiness. 
21. Furthermore, the United States Adminis-
tration has been pursuing similar objectives for 
a considerable time. Defence Secretary Harold 
Brown stated at a press conference on 6th May 
1977 that "we need to concentrate on rationalis-
ing NATO's defence posture. That is, individual 
national contributions must be fitted together 
better. In the short run, we need the ability to 
interchange parts, ammunition, supplies and 
units of soldiers. In the longer run, we aim for 
more standardisation of equipment, together with 
the development of compatible doctrine, tactics 
and procedures ... Such co-operation", Mr. Brown 
argued, "inevitably means more of a two-way 
1. Described in Chapter IV B below. 
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street in defence procurement. The overwhelming 
predominance of United States arms and equip-
ment in use by NATO forces generally should 
give way to greater United States military pur-
chases in Europe. Moreover, there should be more 
licensing of European-designed equipment for 
production in the United States." 1 
IV. The international organisations 
A. The role of NATO 
22. While American political determination to 
develop a transatlantic dialogue on armaments 
questions persists and while Western Europe 
has concerted its efforts to improve European 
co-operation in arms production, the Alliance as 
a whole has within the ambit of NATO pressed 
forward its studies on standardisation and inter-
operability. Interoperability is now accepted as 
essential throughout the Alliance, not least by 
the United States. Standardisation, however, is 
regarded as a desirable objective for the more 
distant future - the late 1980s or 1990s. 
Dr. Walter Laberge, the previous NATO 
Assistant Secretary General for Defence Sup-
port, used to argue that "competition makes 
western technology great" and it is accepted 
within NATO that the military benefits of 
standardisation must not be allowed to be out-
weighed by any drawbacks inherent in monopoly 
supply. 
23. Improved co-ordination of research and 
development between the members of NATO is 
necessary. This will be a difficult task which 
would be achieved by the creation of a supra-
national agency to allocate research and develop-
ment tasks and resources. Information would 
have to be stored which for primarily commercial 
considerations is bound always to be a sensitive 
issue. 
24. Secondly, for interoperability, the stan-
dardisation of component parts rather than of 
systems is of prime importance. One of the main 
difficulties that NATO has faced in this regard 
is that national operational requirements are not 
harmonised by NATO. Nevertheless, strenuous 
efforts are made to achieve the maximum 
rationalisation of arms procurement. 
25. Following the Atlantic summit in London 
in the summer of 1977, NATO launched a long-
term defence programme in which ten areas of 
particular importance (task forces) for the next 
ten years were specified such as readiness, rein-
forcement, etc. 2 The long-term defence pro-
1. "NATO defence co-operation", press conference with 
Harold Brown, Survival, July/August 19771 page 179, 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
2. The task forces are listed at app£-ndix. 
DOCUMENT 786 
gramme draws up specific objectives and 
iden~ifies national participation and costings. It 
cons1sts of long- and medium-term eLements. 
The medium-term one overlaps the normal five-
year rolling programme in which force goals 
for up to five years ahead are established and 
biennially reviewed. 
26. One of the sector studies is known as 
Task Force 8 and deals with rationalisation, i.e. 
the search. for more efficient use of NATO 
resources in the field of standardisation and 
interoperabili.ty of military equipment ; its 
recommendatiOns were transmitted to the capitals 
o~ the member countries in preparation for a 
discussion during a ministerial meeting of the 
Defence Planning Committee in mid-May fol-
lowed by the Washington summit meeting.' This 
~k fo~ce has examined the way NATO plans 
Its eqmpment reprovisioning ; whether there 
~hould be more central planning ; whether changes 
m procedures are nooded to implement stand-
ardisation and inreroperability ; and whether 
changes are needed in staffing in NATO to 
implement standardisation. It has also examined 
~ few other spheres, such as the question of 
mtellectual property rights (the study of prob-
lems conc~rning o'Ynership of patents, payment 
of royalties for licences, etc., in which joint 
ventures very often become bogged down) and 
oth~r schemes to improve standardisation by 
havr~1.g more countries collaborating in the pro-
duction of the same defence equipment. 
27. The recommendations of this task force 
are considered to be "reasonable and modest" 
at NATO. Certain countries, including the United 
States in particular, consider that the recom-
mendations should have gone further but in 
general, all the countrie~ agree on the fact that 
they "will oil the wheels of the organisation 
according to one Atlantic source". The three 
main recommendations of the task force are 1 : 
"The efforts to implement the STANAGs 
should be stepped up 
For many years, through the Military 
Agency for Standardisation (in which 
France participates), the NATO countries 
have concluded standardisation agreements 
- STANAGs- concerning the standard-
isation in particular of the components of 
military equipment. Task Force 8 considers 
that more pressure should be exercised on 
the national governments to implement 
them. The first stage will consist in asking 
the ~ain NATO commanders (MNC) why 
certam STANAGs have not been imple-
mented. 
1. From Atlantic News, No. 1015, 5th April 1978. 
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Continuation of the PAPS studies 
NATO would like to establish a long-term 
armaments planning system. About two 
years ago, the foundations were laid of 
a PAPS (periodic armaments planning 
system) which combines the present and 
future armament requirements of the allied 
countries and also examines the require-
ments of future warfare so as to enable the 
member countries to collaborate to a greater 
extent in developing armaments. The PAPS 
system is only in its initial stage, that of the 
NAT~ armaments planning (NAPR). This 
essentially consists in reviewing national 
military equipment schedules (replacement 
dates, etc.) against NATO requirements 
for standardisation to enforce maximum 
interoperability. 
NATO has chosen six test areas. The two 
naval spheres concern underwater weapons 
- torpedoes and sonobuoys (for detecting 
submarines) ; the two army fields concern 
anti-tank weapons and mortars · and the 
two air force fields laser illumi~ators and 
cluster bombs. The results of this first test 
will not be known until the end of the 
year. Subsequently, it is hoped that it 
will be possible to go on to the second 
stage of the PAPS system, i.e. to group 
together the national countries with respect 
to NATO programmes before they embark 
on their own national plans for the develop-
ment of military equipment. In its con-
clusions, Task Force 8 endorses the PAPS 
studies. 
A new review of national armaments 
planning· 
There is a suggestion to set up a kind of 
high-level committee (probably at the level 
of the dep.uty national armaments directors) 
to co-ordinate and even exercise pressure 
on the main NATO armaments groups, for 
example the army, navy and air forces 
research groups. It might be said, however, 
that the CNAD (Conference of National 
Armaments Directors, which meets twice 
a year) is already accomplishing this co-
ordination task. It is considered however 
at NATO that the CNAD, being formed b; 
experts at a very high level, is often far 
too removed from the daily work of the 
individual armaments groups." 
28. The long-term defence programme was 
endorsed at the Washington smnmit meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council on 30th and 31st May 
19J~. but ~ranee, represented by its Foreign 
MmiSter, did not subscribe to that part of the 
communique. The work of Task Force 8 was 
thus referred to : 
"Rationalisation 
13. The objective is to achieve economic 
savings and enhanced military efficiency 
through increased standardisation. and 
interoperability. Programmes include 
development of new procedures for syste- . 
matic long-range armaments planning, new 
procedures for the improved formulation 
and utilisation of standardisation agree-
ments and continuation of the work under-
taken' by the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors in the field of intel-
lectual prope:rty rights. In the development 
and acquisition of the equipment recom-
mended in the long-term defence pr(}-
gramme co-operative programmes will be 
pursued to the greatest extent possible. 
Nations have also endorsed the need for 
the transfer of technology between member. 
countries where such transfers contribute 
to the furtherance of standardisation/ 
interoperability of NATO defence equip-
ment." 
29. Although it does not participate in the 
long-term defence programme, France through 
its continued membership of the NATO Confer-
ence of National .Arm.ament:B Directors remains 
a participant in the arms co-operation activities 
of the Alliance. Some members of Task Force 8 
attend IEPG meetings, but no formal decision 
has yet been taken on the method of informing 
the IEPG of the work of the task forces ; cer-
tainly the IEPG also is an essential tool of 
weapon rationalisation. 
30. However, there are inherent drawbacks to 
be overcome in any economic rationalisation of 
arms procurement. Buying equipment from 
abroad entails the export of funds and jobs to 
the supplier nation. Of course, equipment designs 
can be purchased and licence construction ini-
tiated but then the economies of large-scale 
produ'ction are lost. Task Force 8 is engaged 
in the resolution of these problems. For example, 
countries can build sections of the equipment 
to be procured. There can be an allocation to 
individual countries of responsibility for the 
supply of different categories of weapon systems. 
Common research and development programmes 
can be instituted although it is unlikely that they 
would produce major financial savings .. -
perhaps a maximum of 10 %. However, Jomt 
production can be very cost-effective, but o?ly 
for really major programmes such as warships, 
aircraft and guided weapons. 
31. From all this, the two basic reasons for· 
standardisation stand clear - military effec-
tiveness and economic logic. The logistic simpli-
fication inherent in weapon standardisation is 
a very important military consideration. The 
principal econom~c consider~tions are t~e ec?-
nomics of scale m productiOn and saVIngs m 
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research and development. The work, therefore, 
of Task Force 8 (defence support) covering the 
equipment and support of NATO forces has 
great potential. Both the support and equipment 
functions offer scope for savings as does the 
whole area of logistics. However, for the imme-
diate future the achievement of a good measure 
of interope;ability is vital such as the ability 
to turn round allied aircraft on the completion 
of a sortie, and harmonisation in the field of 
ammunition, communications and fuel. 
B. The independent European programme group 
32. The IEPG which is only some two and 
a half years old 1 was established under the 
pressure of increasing weapons sophisticat~on 
which prevents any European country meetmg 
its own weapon requirements alone, and from 
the desire to include France in a purely European 
armaments forum with all other European NATO 
members. The IEPG is attempting to achieve 
practical results, particularly to present agreed 
projects to the participating governments. The 
IEPG is seeking to create a balance between 
the armaments capability of the United States 
and Europe by concerting the European allies' 
efforts in the field of defence equipment. 
33. The greatest difficulty which the IEPG 
faces is in achieving a common position without 
damaging the varying national interests of the 
twelve.member countries. The problem of balance 
between the nations with advanced defence 
industries and the others is especially intractable 
and offset considerations are often crucial to the 
agreement of joint projects. 
34. The IEPG meets on two planes. The first 
is at under-secretary of state level 2 under the 
chairmanship of the Italian Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign· Affairs and takes place once 
a year in Rome 3 • The second level is technical. 
The national armaments directors meet under 
Ita1ian chairmanship (originally Admiral 
l\Iainini now Generall\Ioizo) in Rome. Under it, 
there a~e three working panels. The first (the 
equipment planning panel) identifies areas for 
potential co-operati011 and compiles equipment 
replacement schedules. The second (the specific 
projects C(}-ordinating panel) works out the 
machinery of collaboration. The third (the defence 
economics and procedures panel) identifies dif-
ferences in national company laws, export regula-
tions, etc., and proposes means of harmonising 
them. Panel I has collated equipment replace-
ment schedules, transmitted them to NATO and 
1. See paragraph 20. 
2. Some countries being represented by (political) 
under-secretaries of state, others by senior officials. · 
3 . .At the meeting in Rome on 6th and 7th November 
the question of the chairmanship of IEPG is expected 
to be discussed. 
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received comparable schedules from the United 
States and Canada; Panel II has reached an 
advanced stage in some projects and a number 
of agreed collaborative programmes are likely 
to be started soon; Panel III has been operating 
in the very delicate area of economic compensa-
tion and procedures. 
Transatlantic dialogue 
35. Between the three panels and the national 
armaments directors, there is an ad hoc working· 
group on transatlantic dialogue. The IEPG has 
identified four topics for discussion with the 
North Americans : 
( i) the preparation and offer of a list of 
equipment which the West Europeans 
feel that the United States and 
Canada should consider purchasing 
for their troops in Europe ; 
( ii) a list of supplies for American and 
Canadian forces in Europe ; 
(iii) the identification of technical and 
legal obstacles to the entry of Euro-
pean equipment to the North 
American market ; 
( iv) the exchange of information - e.g. 
replacement schedules. 
36. Both the IEPG and North Americans have 
agreed that a working group on obstacles be set 
up, but the latter wish to establish at the same 
time two further open-ended working groups. 
The first would examine possible rationalisation 
of research and development and production. 
The second would examine industrial co-
operation. However, the IEPG is not yet ready 
to respond to these two initiatives. Rational-
isation is already being studied by the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors in 
NATO and there is a danger that these sug-
gestions, if taken up, could lead to a duplication 
of work being done already in another forum -
particularly as France participates in NATO's 
CNAD. Panel I and Panel II of the IEPG are 
therefore making a careful study of the American 
proposals before the IEPG responds. It has been 
agreed that exchange of basic information 
between the IEPG and the North Americans is 
adequately covered by the production of the 
combillled equipment replacement schedules. 
37. At its meeting on 2nd and 3rd October 
1978 the IEPG at the level of national arma-
ments directors welcomed recent United States 
proposals for complementary competitive develop-
ment of families of weapons (designed to avoid 
duplication of development projects in Europe 
and the United States), but called for more 
information at the CNAD meeting on 24th and 
25th October. The IEPG also stressed that the 
bilateral memoranda of understanding now being 
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concluded between the United States and its 
European allies should not jeopardise efforts in 
the IEPG to develop specific equipment projects 
at the European level. 
38. At the present time such memoranda of 
understanding have been concluded between the 
United States on the one hand, and France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and 
the United Kingdom on the other. Others are 
being negotiated with Belgium and Denmark 
as well as Canada. These memoranda on mutual 
trade in defence equipment are designed to waive 
the Buy American Act, to enable the Europeans 
to sell defence equipment in the United States 
to the same value as that sold by the United 
States in Europe. 
39. The succes; of the IEPG will depend on 
its ability to speak with a single voice and on 
the ability of the United States and Canada to 
develop a truly balanced trade with the Euro-
peans in armaments. In this regard, the attitude 
of the United States Administration alone will 
not be critical - the practical attitude of Con-
gress will be crucial also, as the matter of the 
selection of a German or American for the new 
United States army main battle tank has shown. 
The European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) 
40. This body, established by the major arma-
ments firms to make contact with the IEPG, 
meets under the chairmanship of Admiral Azzoni 
of Oto Melara. Its aims are : 
( i) to make proposals to and react to 
suggestions from the IEPG on indus-
trial matters ; 
( ii) to consider the possible association of 
groups of companies to implement 
IEPG programmes ; 
(iii) to offer industrial expertise for use 
if necessary by the IEPG ; 
( iv) to co-operate more closely together 
with a view to making better use of 
available financial and technical 
resources. 
The EDIG informs the IEPG on its proceedings 
and keeps in touch with progress in the work 
of the IEPG panels and group, although no 
formal relationship between the EDIG and IEPG 
has yet been agreed. 
C. The role of WEU 
41. The Council has instructed the Standing 
Armaments Committee to carry out a study in 
three parts. The first part is to define and list 
European armaments and arms manufacturers. 
This task upon which the SAC and IEPG have 
worked together is now complete. 
42. The second part is to define the legal status 
of the various armaments industries to define 
which companies are private, which public, which 
transnational and which nationalised. Also the 
government ordnance factories have had to be 
listed. This report is complete and has been sent 
to the respective national authorities. 
43. The third part concerns the economic facts 
about the European armaments industries. To 
avoid all danger of duplicating the work of 
Panel III Sub-Committee 4 of the IEPG in this 
field, its tempo has been carefully phased and 
method of working appropriately organised. 
44. On the question of staffing, there is 
flexibility in the composition of delegations to 
the Standing Armaments Committee. For 
example, economic experts are invited to attend. 
An economic specialist on the staff of the 
French DGA was attached to the SAC. Likewise, 
two Belgian economic experts have been attached. 
(The IEPG, in contrast, has no permanent 
secretariat and is dependent on the goodwill and 
co-operation of member governments). 
45. At the present time the SAC and the IEPG 
are seeking to obtain from national sources the 
economic and commercial data required for the 
study, taking into acount considerations of com-
mercial or governmental confidentiality. The · 
means required to obtain the information are 
different for different countries and industrial 
sectors. For example Germany, where most of 
the equipment firms are free enterprise concerns, 
requires a different approach from the United 
Kingdom where much of the armament industry 
is nationalised. The kind of data that the SAC 
has been seeking for the study concerns tech-
nology, co-operation, employment and financial 
inputs. 
46. WEU like the IEPG meets various kinds 
of difficulty from national quarters. WEU is 
mostly engaged in paper studies, not in making 
decisions at the present time on specific arma-
ment projects. 
D. Panavia Tornado - A case study in 
collaborative procurement 
NAMMA 
47. The NATO Multiple Combat Aircraft 
Development and Production Management 
Agency is responsible for the day-to-day manage-
ment of the programme for the MRCA, now 
known as the Tornado, ·which is being produced 
for the Luftwaffe, German navy, Italian air 
force and the Royal Air Force. 
48. The top policy-making body responsible for 
the Tornado programme is the trinational policy 
group which is constituted twice a year at natio-
nal armament director level. The policy group 
gives guidance to the board of directors on 
11 
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essential and principal matters of policy and 
resolves those issues which can only be decided 
at a political level. 
49. The more routine control of the project is 
exercised by the board of directors upon which 
official representatives of the three participating 
governments sit together with a representative 
of the Secretary-General of NATO, although he 
rarely attends. Each country has one vote and 
decisions are taken unanimously. NAMMA is 
located at Munich. The staff of NAMMA is 240 
with 107 from Britain, 109 from West Germany 
and 27 from Italy, reflecting broadly the 
governments' participation in the programme. 
50. NAMMA is set up as follows : 
( i) office of general manager and 
deputy general manager ; 
( ii) programme and configuration con-
trol; 
(iii) military factors division ; 
( iv) systems engineering ; 
( v) production and quality assurance ; 
(vi) budgets and contracts ; 
(vii) administration and personnel ; 
(viii) office of the financial controller ; 
( ix) office of secretary to board of 
directors. 
51. Britain has ordered a total of 384 
Tornados of the interdictor/strike variant and 
air defence variant; West Germany has ordered 
322 aircraft for the Luftwaffe and navy and 
Italy 99 aircraft, both the latter being the 
interdictor/strike variant. Two production 
batches have been authorised. From the second 
production batch, Panavia will become the prime 
contractor and all contracts will be authorised 
through them. 
52. Well over half of the aircraft's flight test 
programme has been completed. The first 
instructors for the Tornado will be trained at 
MBB 's military division airfield at Manching 
and possibly all subsequent ones at a joint 
operational conversion unit, RAF Cottesmore. It 
is possible that an Anglo-German weapon train-
ing unit will be formed at RAF Honington. 
53. NA1lfMA is the trinational procurement 
agency . for spares. The three countries will 
exchange defect data with NA1lfMA establishing 
interim trinational repair procedures. 
54. Co-operation has, however, had its price 
as well as its advantages. There are of course 
additional administrative and communication 
costs, although no single nation could have 
afforded to build the aircraft alone. Further-
more, it has not a:Iways been possible to select 
the optimum equipment and in some instances, 
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out of consideration of equity in work sharing 
or for operational reasons, national equipment 
fits have been demanded. 
55. Stores commonality · also between the 
customer services will not be as good as had been 
envisaged because of the need to maximise the 
utilisation of respective countries' existing 
weapon stocks. 
56. The experience and expertise of NAMMA 
should be harnessed for the procurement of a 
European successor to the Tornado. In this 
regard, the time-scales for the two clear poten-
tial national inputs to such a project - the 
Royal Air Force's AST-403 and the Luftwaffe's 
Neue Kampf Flugzeug - must be resolved. 
57. The Tornado approach to collaboration has 
proved basically sound. Pure subcontracting as 
with the F-16 programme is less satisfactory. 
The Tornado system of procurement ensures that 
continuous in-service development is possible and 
that expertise is spread among the partner com-
panies. The procurement system by contrast used 
for the British Phantom made in-service develop-
ment difficult. 
58. A dilemma remains over work sharing, 
Should it in the future be based on propor-
tionality of financial input as with the Tornado 
or should partner nations in a successor project 
be able to play down social and political con-
siderations by specifying the most cost-effective 
options on airframe and engine construction and 
equipment Y 
59. Lessons also need to be l-earned from the 
experience with Tornado over the aircraft's 
RB-199 power plant which was developed at the 
same time as the aircraft. However, engines take 
usually three years longer to develop than a 
new airframe and the aircraft's development 
has been consequently delayed. 
View of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm 
60. Clearly, one of the great , benefits of a 
multinational combat aircraft programme is that 
the differing expertise of the participating coun-
tries can ensure an. optimised joint approach to 
the project. 
61. If a· new joint combat aircraft programme 
were initiated by the partner companies, the 
design team should be centralised, but final 
assembly and flight test should be decentralised 
as with Tornado. Separate flight testing 
increases the overall cost but speeds up the 
development programme. The friendly rivalry of 
the respective flight test establishments is a spur 
to progress. 
62. If a new military aircraft were initiated 
with the United States, there would be dif-
ficulties changing all the standards from metric. 
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However, if a new project were initiated by the 
Panavia partners, some 20 % of the development 
time would be cut. 
63. The repair of aircraft sections made by 
one of the other partner nations usually pre-
sents no problem except when a return to the 
jigs is required. Because final assembly takes 
place in each of the partner countries, general 
expertise on the aircraft is satisfactorily spread 
and shared. 
64. N.A11iMA's role in ensuring a degree of 
commonality between the aircraft in service with 
the different services is very important. The 
co-location also of NAMMA and Panavia in the 
same building is extremely useful. However, 
NAMMA can be slow in reaching decisions and 
should have more authority, likewise Panavia 
should be given more authority over the resolu-
tion of technical problems. 
65. The choice of equipments specified rests 
with the partner nations. When a system 
manufacturer is chosen, he may choose two sub-
system collaborators in the partner countries. 
The aircraft would not have been built in the 
view of the MBB experts if design leadership 
had rested with one airframe manufacturer. 
66. The project is thought to be especially 
helpful to Italy industrially. Almost every 
Italian aerospace company is involved in the air-
craft in one way or another. The employment-
generating effect of the Tornado programme in 
Italy is considerable. Furthermore, although Italy 
contributes to only a 15 % share of the work, 
Italian industry benefits fully from sharing 
technical knowledge and acts as a full partner 
in the aircraft's management. 
Panavia 
67. The long-term significance of the Panavia 
Tornado programme has been well summarised 
by Mr. F.W. Page, Chairman of Panavia, at a 
press conference at the Hanover air show on 
26th April 1978, who, when asked whether 
Panavia would undertake further projects now 
that the Tornado was in production, said : 
"The answer must be Yes, if and when 
our customers agree on their future require-
ments. Panavia represents the first 
determined and successful attempt by three 
major European nations to get together 
to rationalise their defence requirements 
and to co-produce a major weapon system 
to meet those requirements. It is a huge 
step forward in the evolution of European 
commonality which has important ramifica-
tions in many important areas such as 
finance, tax and company law, as well as 
in supply, logistics, operations and training. 
It is therefore inconceivable that this 
pioneering effort should in future be 
thrown away and wasted. Indeed, we hope 
it will expand so that Panavia will include 
other nations." 1 
V. The view from national capitals 
A. Belgium 
68. The greatest constraint on Belgian weapons 
procurement lies in the fact that Belgium's 
defence requirements are well below its indus-
trial capacity and it is therefore difficult for it 
to develop or produce defence equipment in 
general, except for telecommunications equip-
ment, small arms and munitions of all calibres 
which are Belgium's principal exports in this 
field. 
69. There is no specific research. and develop-
ment allocation within the Belgian defence 
budget - such research as does take place is 
purely on the scientific level and not directed 
towards particular projects or weapons. ·weapon 
research at Fabrique N ationale is financed 
privately. Where possible, Belgium is trying 
to participate in joint research and development 
as has been done with the new minehunters 
which are being developed with France, Ger-
many and the Netherlands. 
70. Belgium hopes that the IEPG will prove 
helpful and that both European co-production 
and transatlantic co-production (two-way street) 
will be possible. If the Belgian armaments 
industry produced only for the Belgian market, 
the production runs would be too short and unit 
costs too high. Belgium has therefore to be 
involved in co-operative ventures and the most 
effective were co-production programmes like the 
General Dynamics F-16. 
71. The creation of a European Armaments 
Agency would be desirable so long as competition 
is retained. For a small country like Belgium, 
offset considerations are of crucial significance 
in the work allocation for any jointly-agreed 
weapon programme as are social considerations 
such as employment. 
B. France 
72. The percentage of the defence budget 
allocated to personnel and associated functions 
is 57 % and the percentage allocated to equip-
ment 43%-
73. Of the expenditure on equipment, 25% 
is spent on research and development of which 
5 % is research in. the pure sense and 20 % is 
development expenditure. These figures are on 
the old basis of budgetary computation whereby 
1. Panavia press release, Munich, 27th April 1978. 
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the cost of service pensions is not included in 
the defence budget. 
74. A summary of the major equipment 
replacement programmes for the French armed 
forces for the next ten years is at Appendix III. 
Air force 
75. To replace the Mirage 3 and Mirage F-1 
interceptors, the Mirage 2000 is entering pro-
duction in 1982. To replace the Jaguar attack/ 
strike aircraft, a new aeroplane would be 
required. Discussions are being held with the 
British and West German Ministries of Defence 
on this project. In addition, a new generation 
of air-launched guided weapons would be 
required. 
Army 
76. The principal requirement is for a new 
battle tank to replace the AMX-30. 
Navy 
77. The Foch and Clemenceau aircraft carriers 
will need to be replaced. This is so far only at 
the planning stage. No firm decisions have yet 
been made. New anti-submarine and anti-aircraft 
frigates will be required throughout the next 
decade. A second generation of surface-to-surface 
guided weapons to succeed the Exocet will be 
required. 
Strategic strike force 
78. Multiple warheads need to be developed as 
a matter of urgency for France's submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, and the first of a new 
generation of ballistic missile submarines is to 
be constructed to enter service in 1985. 
French view of independent European pro-
gramme group 
79. Progress is difficult with twelve nations 
participating. There are sometimes divergent 
views and interests. For example, the more 
industrialised nations with highly developed 
armaments industries have different interests 
and criteria to apply to the questions of arms 
procurement from those nations which have no 
armaments industries of their own. 
80. A policy of deliberate preference in favour 
of European equipment is essential if the Euro-
pean armaments industry is not to be 
overwhelmed by American imports. The United 
States enjoys the advantage of scale, great 
research and development funding and protec-
tion (the Buy American Act). 
81. Before the independent European pro-
gramme group was initiated all other avenues 
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of co-operation had been exhausted. France would 
like the SAC of WEU to have more work to do 
also. 
C. Federal Republic of Germany 
82. From experience already derived, parti-
cularly from the Panavia Tornado and Sepecat 
Jaguar consortia, it is clear that Europe has the 
capability to carry out future military aircraft 
programmes. 
83. The three leading nations in the aerospace 
field, France, West Germany and the United 
Kingdom, will all be looking for new combat 
aircraft around the 1990s. France and the United 
Kingdom will be seeking a successor to Jaguar, 
whereas West Germany will be seeking a succes-
sor to the Phantom. 
84. The aircraft industry . in the Federal 
Republic values outside technical support for a 
European programme, hence the usefulness of 
the support from the McDonnell Douglas com-
pany which MBB is currently receiving and of 
the support which BAC in Britain receives from 
the Grumman company. 
85. An industrial approach to arms procure-
ment rationalisation is preferred. However, it 
has to be borne in mind that in the Federal 
Republic, the armament industry is in private 
hands and cannot therefore be ordered to 
rationalise by the government. The government 
can only encourage rationalisation by a judicious 
administration of its powers of project sponsor-
ship and funding. 
86. The Federal Republic of Germany is 
probably better suited than the United Kingdom 
to giving up some of its authority to a supra-
national body like an international armament 
agency. The United Kingdom is in a more 
ambivalent position having ties with both Europe 
and with the United States. 
87. West Germany's defence expenditure is 
rising at 3.5 % per annum, but because of infla-
tion the real increase is smaller. 
88. The two-way street has already been 
initiated. First on the question of a gun for the 
United States army's new main battle tanks, the 
American Administration has decided in 
principle to purchase the German gun for all 
tanks procured beyond number 3,000 on the 
production line. 
89. Over Roland II, Germany has had to 
persuade the American authorities that full 
Americanisation of the system is against United 
States interests in view of the considerable 
benefits of standardisation with the weapons 
with which the French and German armed forces 
are equipped. 
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90. The lack of a united policy to concert the 
production in Europe of weapons which could 
be offered to the United States is especially 
regrettable. In three particular areas the Euro-
peans could develop weapons of the highest 
quality - third-generation anti-tank missiles, 
air-to-air missiles and air-to-ship missiles. The 
Europeans could develop their systems in parallel 
with those being developed by the United States 
with the selection being decided by a competition. 
91. The current difficulty has been that the 
United States has offered to participate from 
the start in arms programmes in Europe while 
continuing to develop its own competitor weapon 
systems. 
92. As far as West Germany is concerned, all 
its new projects will be done co-operatively and 
the Federal Republic will do its very best to 
concert its requirements with those of its allies. 
In the field of small projects however, such as 
telecommunications and small arms, the emphasis 
within NATO is on standardisation and they 
could initially be developed separately with a 
competitive final selection. · 
D. Italy 
93. Italy gives tangible support to the IEPG 
and encourages its activities which are now con-
centrated on two basic sectors, transatlantic 
dialogue an,d the drafting of specific projects ; 
where the transatlantic dialogue is concerned, 
it has become apparent that the parties wish to 
move on as quickly as possible to the concrete 
stage of achievements. In comparing positions, it 
became clear that there are still different posi-
tions between the two sides of the Atlantic. 
94. The tendency of the North American allies 
to speed up the dialogue and extend the frame-
work to cover wider subjects is limited by the 
IEPG's need in each case to harmonise its posi-
tion beforehand within the organisation so as to 
speak with a single voice, which the North 
Americans expect, moreover. 
95. In any event, Italy believes that in view 
of the complexity of the dialogue it must take 
the form of continuing negotiations but on a 
pragmatic and gradual basis ; differences of 
opinion which are inevitable at the outset when 
tackling matters which involve the parties' 
fundamental interests must not lead to discour-
agement. 
96. Progress in the dialogue assumes parallel 
progress in the constructive work within the 
IEPG where the greatest effort is needed, i.e. 
carrying out meaningful projects on a colla-
borative basis. 
97. In this context, it seems essential for the 
IEPG 's work to be given constant and effective 
political impetus by member countries with a 
view to carrying out a few wholly IEPG projects 
without delay. Italy has taken appropriate steps 
to ensure that its national representatives in the 
various working groups concentrate their atten-
tion on specific procedure relating to every 
aspect of co-operation, recently confirmed by the 
national armaments directors, with a view to 
finding concrete and effective means of speed-
ing work up. 
98. The coming months can be used for con-
tinuing the present work of shaping and com-
position which, in spite of the various levels of 
agreement to be successively obtained, should 
allow the major difficulties to be overcome and 
even more effective forms of co-operation to 
·be found. 
VI. Conclusions 
99. Mr. Leo Tindemans in his report on Euro-
pean union suggested that consideration should 
be given to the establishment of a European 
armaments agency. Likewise the Commission 
of the EEC's action programme for the aero-
nautical sector (Spinelli report) presented to the 
Council of the European Communities on 30th 
October 1975 advocated a similar body for the 
procurement of military aircraft. Also the Euro-
pean Parliament resolved on 15th December 1975 
that "an agency ultimately aimed at the joint 
manufacture of weapons meeting the require-
ments of the NATO states" be established. 
100. More recently there was the tabling in the 
European Parliament on 15th December 1976 
by Mr. Berkhouwer of a motion for a resolution 
on co-operation in the armaments sector, in which 
he referred to the Tindemans proposal for the 
establishment of a European armaments agency 
and the importance for the attainment of a com-
mon European industrial policy of rationalisa-
tion of the European armaments industry, and 
called on the Commission of the European Com-
munities to submit to the Council an action 
programme for a European policy on the pro-
curement of armaments. 
101. This text was referred to the Political 
Committee of the European Parliament and 
Mr. Egon Klepsch appointed as Rapporteur. His 
report of 8th May 1978 on European armaments 
procurement co-operation (Document 83/1978) 
reiterates the call for the Commission of the 
European Communities to draw up an action 
programme· to define "potential responsibilities 
concerning the development of a common arma-
ments procurement policy within the overall 
framework of a common industrial policy". It 
even considers as "indefensible any further 
attempts to establish a common industrial policy 
which does not include this key sector". On 
14th June 1978 the European Parliament 
adopted the resolution in the Klepsch report 
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calling on the European Commission "to submit 
to the Council in the near future a European 
action programme for the development and pro-
duction of conventional armaments within the 
framework of the common industrial policy". 
102. While Mr. Davignon, replying for the Com-
mission, considered that armaments production 
and trade could be the subject of a Community 
approach, either in the framework of commercial 
policy (customs) o.r of industrial policy, reactions 
of governments so far have been divided. Mr. de 
Guiringaud, the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, on 23rd June considered Mr. Davignon's 
interpretation of the Rome Treaties "open to 
criticism", while Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister 
.for Foreign Affairs, said on 20th July that the 
Belgian Government considered it "desirable" 
that the institutions of the Community should 
pay attention to the armaments industry. The 
Klepsch report was discussed by the IEPG on 
3rd October 1978, which found it an "interest-
ing proposal'' according to press reports. 
103. Wl1at is surprising is that the pursuit of 
common industrial objectives in the context of 
a joint policy for the procurement and manu-
facture of arms should have been neglected so 
long. 
104. There is surely a strong case for the Euro-
pean Economic Community to be concerned in 
this important aspect of the economies of its 
member states. All the members of the Com-
munity, except the Irish Republic, are also mem-
bers of the North Atlantic Alliance. So are 
Greece, Turkey and Portugal whose admission 
to the Community is on the way. They are the 
same countries though associated for different 
purposes. The Treaty of Rome makes no refer-
ence to defence, nor have the organs of the 
Community - Council, Commission, Court and 
Assembly - any military function. This is well 
understood. It is the Treaty of Brussels and the 
North Atlantic Treaty which provided concur-
rently for the collective defence of the same 
group of European powers, though many of us 
believe that the failure of the attempt to create 
a European defence community in 1954 marked 
a tragic set-back for the idea of Europe. The 
designation of specific weapons, standardisation 
agreements, joint production and all the technical 
aspects of NATO's long-term defence programme 
must remain the responsibility of the Military 
Committee of the Alliance, assisted by the 
Military Agency for Standardisation, the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors and 
the international bodies mentioned above, notably 
the IEPG, which has the practical merit of 
including France, as well as the other NATO 
members. But, none of these bodies, whose aim 
is to achieve particular objectives of the defence 
programme, is competent to devise a common 
policy for the procurement and manufacture of 
arms as a necessary part of the economy and 
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industrial life of the nations concerned. The 
EEC is the only European institution in a posi-
tion to bring about the restructuring of the 
Buropean arms industry, which is vital to the 
introduction of a common procurement policy 
as well as to systematic co-operation and inter-
change with the armaments industry of the 
United States, which could make the two-way 
street a permanent feature of the Atlantic 
Alliance. Hitherto, the Community has suffered 
from having no regard to the armaments industry 
in Europe. In 1976, 22 % of all the research 
and development funds' of its governments were 
accounted for by that industry, so that, without 
it, a common industrial policy cannot be estab-
lished. Secondly, the co-ordination of procure-
ment and manufacture of weapons by the 
national defence establishments has, so far, 
resulted in a number of fragmented, individual 
projects because there was no coherent organisa-
tion on the production side. 
How the task might be discharged 
105. Were the EEC to set up, as is suggested, 
a body to co-ordinate the procurement and manu-
facture of the arms of its member states, which 
would be either a section of the Commission, 
or an agency responsible to it, what would be its 
modus operandi 1 It would be through the Min-
isters of Defence sitting on the Council of the 
Community that it would receive definitions of 
the military material needed for a given period, 
the Ministers of states represented in NATO's 
Defence Planning Committee basing their 
requirement on their commitments to the 
mediurri- and long-term defence programmes of 
the organisation, the French and Irish Ministers 
indicating the common projects, if any, in which 
their governments wished to participate. It would 
then be a question of identifying and co-
ordinating the expertise available in each of the 
existing national arms industries and firms con-
tracting for governments. On the industrial side 
the problems would not be essentially different 
from those of industrial policy in general, in 
much of which the European Community is 
already involved - location of works, employ-
ment, worker participation, investment, social 
welfare and the environment. 
106. There would be a number of financial, 
technical and legal problems involved in a 
system of co-ordinated production of armaments. 
For example, guarantees would be needed to 
protect some countries against losses in their 
balance of payments, incurred in the short term. 
For example, this would not necessarily apply to 
individual projects, but, on the basis of several 
projects over a number of years,. an effort ought 
to be made to operate the principle of fair 
return. Procurement, that is the purchase of arms 
and technical know-how from countries outside 
the Community, should also come under the 
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responsibility of the Community's agency, in 
order to protect fair competition, and ensure, as 
far as possible, equality of advantages (with the 
exception of the particular United States legisla-
tive restrictions on the transfer of nuclear 
devices). 
107. This would be necessary, particularly in 
the longer term, so as to prevent a few Euro-
pean undertakings from acquiring a virtual 
monopoly through the restructuring of industry 
that must take place. Such companies should 
continue to live at risk. Co-operation on such 
procurement would also be necessary as part of 
any intercontinental collaboration between 
Europe and the United States. Through close col-
laboration on procurement, it would be possible 
to make purchases of American arms and equip-
ment conditional on equivalent purchases by the 
Americans from Europe, so establishing the 
desired two-way street. 
108. Another important area where the Com-
munity could make its influence felt is the 
financing of industrial research and develop-
ment, undertaken in co-operation between firms 
in several member states in' areas of special 
interest to the armaments industry as well. Most 
research and development projects in the air-
craft, computer and electronic industries £aU into 
this category. 
109. Furthermore, the creation of a common 
fund to facilitate structural change would be a 
natural task for the Commission. Consideration 
might also be given to whether or not the Com-
munity should play some part in building up 
common buffer stocks of strategic raw materials 
so that, in a crisis, production could be main-
tained in both defence and civilian industries. 
110. Having regard to the existing overlapping 
and wastage of money on research and develop-
ment in the production of armaments, the co-
ordination of research and development suggests 
itself as a subject particularly suitable for an 
arms-production agency of the Community. This 
is a prickly subject, involving not only the 
expertise, amour-propre and vested interests of 
many pundits in each country but also patents 
and national security legislation. 
111. Evidently, the research findings of a partic-
ular project sponsored by the · Community 
ought to be fully accessible to all those under-
takings taking part in it. But there is also the 
question of whether research findings should be 
available to the participating countries for 
onward transmission to other enterprises, in cases 
where organisations from only some of the 
countries taking part are involved on the manu-
facturing side. If this cannot be implemented, 
steps should be taken to ensure that, over a 
period of time, projects are allocated in such a 
way that individual participating countries do 
not acquire a monopoly of advanced technology 
in one or more areas. 
112. Other problems which would arise from 
the intervention of the Community in the 
restructuring of the European arms industry 
would include : rules of compensation, partic-
ularly for lO&s of exports ; the legal framework 
for co-operation between undertakings, both in 
respect of company law and the law of contract, 
would need revision ; and, in the same way, the 
legal basis for the allocation of research and 
development contracts and production contracts, 
including, in particular, common rules for 
adjudicating tenders, should, if not actually 
determined within an EEC framework, be worked 
out in collaboration with the Commission. 
113. The real difficulty of any such plan out-
lined above, is not detail but principle. We are 
dealing with sovereign, independent states, all 
of whom to a greater or lesser extent, regard a 
nationally-owned arms industry as going to the 
heart of their concept of sovereignty. It is clear 
that such co-operation as there is at present 
between the member states of the EEC on the 
procurement and manufacture of arms is not the 
result of any coherent, long-term policy, but 
relates solely to isolated projects, where the 
partners have usually had to choose between 
collaboration or abandonment of the project. 
114. Has Europe the political will to recom-
mence its journey towards unity Y There are 
three traditional routes : unity through conquest, 
which has been tried and failed ; unity through 
economic integration, which has run into the 
sands, and unity through the fear of a common 
enemy. Soviet rearmament has increased the 
perception of the threat in Europe. But are we 
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sufficiently afraid to begin the necessary process 
of dismantling the bastions of our national 
sovereignty Y The idea of a European defence 
community evaporated, as we know, in the 1950s, 
w}len Germany joined its former enemies in the 
American-European Alliance. Today, we should 
start to talk once again about the defence of 
Europe in the context of Europe. A Community-
wide arms procurement and manufacture agency, 
the purpose of which would be to restructure the 
European arms industry, is, in the long term, the 
only way in which Europe can retain the ability 
to make arms, which it needs today, and by so 
doing, guarantee its own independence. 
Vfi. Opinion of the minority 
115. The report as a whole was adopted in Com-
mittee by 7 votes to 6 with 3 abstentions. A 
minority of the Committee was opposed to involv-
ing the European Community in armaments 
industry policy, and some members would there-
fore have deleted paragraph 2 of the draft recom-
mendation. Some members believed such involve-
ment would be divisive of the Alliance, possibly 
isolating the United States or the allied Euro-
pean countries which are not members of the 
Community, or might impose too great a burden 
on the Community or. undermine the IEPG ; 
others again doubted the legality of the proposal. 
Several were anxious to ensure greater parlia-
mentary control- at national and international 
level - of the armaments industry. Th~ view 
was also expressed that some proposals of the 
report could lead, through standardisation, to a 
new integration which was held to be detri-
mental. 
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APPENDIX I 
The ten action areas under the NATO long-term defence 
programme on which task forces have been established 1 
APPENDIX l 
1. Readiness 6. Communications, command and control 
2. Reinforcement 
3. Reserve mobilisation 
4. Maritime posture 
5. Air defence 
1. See paragraphs 25 et seq. of the explanatory memo· 
randum. 
7. Electronic warfare 
8. Rationalisation 
9. Logistics 
10. Theatre nuclear modernisation 
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APPENDIX III 
Future equipment programmes 
(a) Belgium 
Equipment· to be replaced in the future in 
the three armed forces subject to the approval of 
the various supervisory bodies : 
(a) improvement of six Hawk (Helip) 
batteries; 
(b) replacement of ±1,200 infantry armou-
red vehicles (IA V) ; 
(c) modernisation of the equipment of a 
signals battalion ensuring communica-
tions for the staff headquarters ; 
(d) renewal of army transport vehicles in 
continuation of a programme already 
under way covering : 
- 1,800 quarter-ton 4 X 4 vehicles; 
- 900 8-10-ton lorries; 
.,...._ 160 tractors and semi-trailers ; 
- 100 wheeled breakdown vehicles ; 
(e) procurement of 330 Milan systems for 
the ATK surface programme ; 
(f) RITA programme: extension to other 
transmission equipment ; 
(g) procurement of air-to-air and air-to-
surface munitions, mainly for F-16 air-
craft. 
(b) France 
Principal armaments programmes recently 
launched or likely to be launched by France 
in the coming years 
Naval armaments 
- Nuclear submarine (attack) 
- Minehunter (with Belgium and the 
Netherlands) 
- ASW and anti-aircraft corvettes 
- Carrier-borne Super Etendard fighter 
aircraft 
- New-generation Atlantic maritime patrol 
aircraft 
- Anti-submarine helicopters 
-Torpedoes 
- Second-generation anti-ship missile 
- Self-defence systems for ships 
Land armaments 
- Main combat vehicle 
- Anti-tank helicopter 
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- Tactical transport helicopter 
- Third-generation anti-tank missiles 
- Individual light weapon 
- Self-propelled and towed 155 mm howit-
zers 
_:_ Very short-range ground-air missile 
- Artillery rockets 
- Battlefield surveillance systems 
- Artillery assistance systems 
- RITA communications network 
Air armaments 
- Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft 
- Alpha-Jet trainer aircraft 
- Air-air missiles 
- Laser-guided air-surface missiles and 
rockets 
- Interception radar 
- Helicopter and aircraft engines 
- Tactical fighter aircraft 
(c) United Kingdom 
Production and development 1 
Royal Navy 
311. Ships 
(a) Nuclear-powered ·fleet submarines. These 
vessels are designed for hunterjkiller operations 
against surface ships and submarines. HMS 
Sceptre, the tenth nuclear-powered fleet sub-
marine and the fourth of the Swiftsure class, is 
planned to enter service shortly and two more 
of the class are under construction. The order 
for HMS Trafalgar, the first vessel of a new 
class of nuclear-powered fleet submarines, was 
placed last year and a second is planned for the 
. coming year. These submarines will have improve-
ments in equipment, endurance and speed which 
will enable them to be more effective in their 
primary role of hunting and detecting enemy 
submarines and surface ships in support of 
NATO operations. 
(b) Anti-submarine cruisers. HMS Invincible, 
the first of the anti-submarine cruisers, was 
1. Statement on defence estimates 1978, Cmnd 7099. 
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launched in :May 1977 and construction work 
on the second, HMS Illustrious, continues. A 
third ship of this class is planne<;l. 
(c) Destroyers. Two Type 42 guided-missile 
destroyers are now in service and a third, HMS 
Newcastle, will shortly be accepted into service. 
Three more are due to enter service in the com-
ing year. Four more ships were on order at the 
beginning of this year and further orders are 
planned. 
(d) Frigates. Seven Type 21 frigates are now 
in service and the last of the class is expected 
to enter service shortly. With the launching of 
HMS Battleaxe in 1977, two Type 22 frigates 
are now fitting out and two more are under 
construction. A fifth Type 22 is planned to be 
ordered this year. 
(e) Mine countermeasures vessels. HMS Led-
bury, the second vessel of the Hunt class of mine 
c·ountermeasures vessels, is under construction 
and further orders are planned for this year. 
(f) Patrol vessels. Five ships of the Island class 
have now entered service as offshore patrol 
vessels. Two further ships of this class have 
been ordered for a variety of tasks including 
coastal fishery protection. 
(g) Fleet replenishment skips. RF A Fort Grange 
will enter service this year and a further vessel 
is under construction. 
(h) Refits. The modernisation of HMS Dido, 
the last of the first batch of eight ships in the 
Leander class frigate refit programme, is 
expected to be completed later this year. Modern-
isation of three ships in the second batch is com-
plete, with four more in progress. Work has also 
begun on the refit of HMS Andromeda, the first 
ship in the third batch, which will include the 
fitting of the Sea Wolf point-defence missile 
system, Exocet anti-ship missiles, enhanced sonar 
equipments and electronic warfare equipment. 
312. Naval aviation 
(a) Sea Harrier. The first front-line Sea Harrier 
squadron is planned to form in 1980 for embark-
ation initially in HMS Hermes. The second will 
embark in HMS Invincible, and ultimately all 
squadrons will be deployed in ships of her class. 
The aircraft will be armed with Sidewinder 
Ail\f9L air-to-air and P3T air-to-surface missiles 
to provide it with a quick-reaction capability 
against enemy aircraft and an attack capability 
against surface vessels. 
(b) Naval helicopters. Sea King Mark 1 heli-
copters are being modified to the standards of 
Mark 2 helicopters, currently in production. Sea 
Kings will also be fitted With an improved radar 
and communications system and an acoustic pro-
cessor and sonobuoys to supplement the existing 
dunking sonar. The other helicopter under pro-
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duction for the Royal Navy is the Lynx Mark 2, 
which will be operated from most destroyers and 
frigates .. 
Naval weapons 
313. Air-defence weapons 
(a) Sea Dart. This medium-range surface-to-air 
guided weapon system is now fitted in three 
ships, and is expected to be accepted into opera-
tional service this year. A programme is under 
way for an improved Sea Dart system and · 
supporting radars to increase its air-defence 
capabilities to meet the expected threat in the 
mid to late 1980s. 
(b)Sea Wolf. The intensive series of sea trials 
on board HMS Penelope proved highly successful 
and production of both missile and ship system 
has begun. 'l'he weapon system is in advance of 
all others of its type and will provide the Type 
22 frigate and other ships with a close-range self-
defence capability against missiles and aircraft. 
A programme of improvements is in hand to 
maintain the capability of Sea Wolf in the face 
of expected developments in· the threat. 
314. Anti-surface skip weapons 
(a) Sub-Harpoon. Negotiations were completed 
with the United States Government last October 
for the full development of Sub-Harpoon, a sub-
marine-launched, air flight long-range anti-ship 
missile which will provide the main anti-surface 
ship armament of our submarine fleet from the 
early 1980s. 
(b) Sea Skua. This anti-ship missile is expected 
to enter service in the early 1980s. Carried by 
the Lynx helicopter, it is intended to provide 
destroyers and frigates with an attack capability 
stretching far beyond their horizon. 
(c) NATO anti-surface ship missile. Joint 
feasibility studies are now in hand with a number 
of NATO allies for the next generation of anti-
ship missiles for servic.e in the late 1980s and 
1990s. 
315. Anti-submarine weapons 
(a) Heavyweight torpedoes. Feasibility studies 
for a successor to the submarine-launched Tiger-
fish torpedo have begun. 
(b) LigktweiriM torpedoes. Development is con-
tinuing on Sting Ray, the advanced lightweight 
torpedo. It is designed to succeed the American 
Mk 46 torpedo and will be capable of being 
launched from surface ships, helicopters and RAF 
Nimrod aircraft. · 
316. Other naval equipment 
(a) Propulsion units. A new marine propulsion 
unit based on the latest version of the Rolls-
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Royce Spey aero-engine has entered full develop-
ment. 
(b) Sonars. Several types of new sonar equip-
ment are being developed and fitted to provide 
surface ships, submarines and helicopters with 
improved anti-submarine detection and classifica-
tion capabilities. 
(c) Electronic warfare and communications 
equipment. Advanced new electronic warfare and 
communications equipment are included in natio-
nal and collaborative development and produc-
tion programmes. A NATO collaborative develop-
ment. programme is in hand for a decoy system 
for use against anti-surface ship missiles .. 
(d) Navigation equipment. Production orders 
have been placed for an improved inertial navi-
gational system which will be fitted in sub-
marines and the new anti-submarine cruiser. 
(e) Ship radars. An advanced air surveillance 
and target indication radar is being developed 
and will be in service with the surface fleet by 
the mid-1980s. 
(f) Airborne radars. The Seaspray airborne 
search radar is now in full production. This is 
being fitted in the Lynx helicopter and will pro-
vide target information for Sea Skua missiles. 
Blue Fox, a derivative of Seaspray, is under 
development and will be fitted in the Sea Harrier 
for air-to-air and air-to-surface roles. 
(g) Action information systems. The large 
majority of the surface fleet will be fitted with 
computer-based action information systems toge-
ther with digital data links by the mid-1980s. 
Army 
317. Armoured forces 
(a) Chieftain. Work on the planned improve-
ments to maintain and enhance the effectiveness 
of Chieftain into the 1980s is going ahead. In 
addition to latest marks of the tank laser sight, 
units will also this year begin to receive the 
muzzle reference system. A number of modifica-
tions to improve the reliability of the main 
engine are being incqrporated into the fleet. 
(b) Chieftain replacement (MBT 80). The 
Anglo-German collaborative studies on a future 
main battle tank were terminated in March last 
year. Although there was a large measure of 
agreement on the details of the requirement, 
both countries felt that collaborative develop-
ment and production would not be possible, 
mainly because the time-scales in which each 
country required the replacement tank became 
incompatible during the course of the joint 
work. National studies on the best way of meet-
ing our requirement for a tank to be in service 
by the late 1980s are now in progress, and these 
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will make use of the valuable work carried out 
during the joint concept studies. 
(c) Mechanised infantry combat vehicle. The 
second phase of project definition for a mechan-
ised infantry combat vehicle, to replace part 
of the present FV430 series of armoured person-
nel carriers in the 1980s, began in August Jast 
year. Project definition has also begun on a series 
of variants. · 
(d) Tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles. 
Two more variants in the series are now entering 
service - Striker, which carries the Swingfire 
anti-tank guided weapon system, and the com-
mand vehicle, Sultan. The last variants in the 
series, Samaritan, an armoured ambulance, and 
Samson, a recovery vehicle, are planned to enter 
the production phase this year. 
(e) Combat engineer tractor. The new combat 
engineer tractor will enter service this year. 
318. Artillery and associated equipment 
(a) FH 70 and SP 70. The towed 155 mm field 
howitzer, FH 70, will begin to enter service 
early next year. The three collaborating coun-
tries, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Italy, are also continuing 
development work on the self-propelled version, 
SP 70. Prototypes have been produced and are 
now undergoing technical evaluation trials. 
(b) Supervisor. Development of Supervisor, a 
battlefield surveillance and target acquisition 
system using real-time data transmission, is 
continuing. Supervisor is based on an unmanned 
miniature helicopter, the prototype of which will 
make its first flight in the spring of this year. 
(c) Cervantes. Development of a trailer-mounted 
radar, to locate rocket launchers and mortars, is 
continuing. 
319: Army guided weapons. 
(a) Rapier air-defence missile system. Deploy-
ment of the all-weather blindfire tracking radar, 
DN 181, will begin early this year. Studies are 
now being carried out on further improvements 
to Rapier and to evaluate the cost-effectiveness 
of a tracked version. 
(b) Helicopter-borne anti-tank guided weapon. 
Following the evaluation of the Franco-German 
HOT and the American TOW systems, the 
Ministry of Defence announced in August last 
year. that TOW is to be adopted and will enter 
service with the army Lynx helicopter in the 
early 1980s. A substantial part of the equipment 
will be manufactured under licence in the United 
Kingdom. 
(c) Swingfire long-range anti-tank guided 
weapon. Development is continuing of a thermal-
imaging night sight for Swingfire. Discussions 
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have also begun with France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the requirement for a 
third-generation long-range anti-tank guided 
·weapon. 
(d) Milan medium-range anti-tank guided 
weapon. It has been possible to accelerate delivery 
of the initial batch of Milan equipments being 
bought from . the Franco-German consortium, 
Euromissile. Deliveries of this batch began last 
year and will be spread over two years. Develop-
ment of a thermal-imaging night sight for Milan 
has begun on a collaborative tripartite basis be-
tween the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and France. 
320. Other army equipment 
(a) Light anti-armour weapon. Project defini-
tion began last year on a man-portable anti-
armour weapon to replace the 84 mm Carl Gustav 
recoilless rifle and 66 mm M72 roc;ket. Discus-
sions are taking place within the EPG on the 
possibilities of collaboration. 
(b) Small arms. NATO technical trials to select 
a standard calibre for future small arms began 
last year, and military tests will begin later this 
year. The new British 4.85 mm weapon system, 
comprising an automatic rifle and light support 
weapon, has been entered in the trials and the 
results should be available by the end of next 
year. 
(c) Mines. The Barmine anti-tank mine is now 
in service and work began last year to develop 
additional fuses to extend its operational applica-
tion and improve its resistance to countermeas-
ures. The complementary off-route mine and the 
Ranger scatterable anti:personnel mine system 
will enter service later this year. · 
(d) Electronic warfare. In July last year, an 
electronic-warfare regiment took its place in the 
order of battle of 1 (BR) Corps. Most of its 
equipment will be British, although some is being 
bought from France. Further improvements in 
our electronic-warfare capability are under con-
sideration. 
(e) Lynx helicopter. Intensive flying trials of 
the army version of Lynx have been completed, 
and the helicopter is expected to enter service 
in the middle of this year, replacing the Scout. 
(f) Vehicles. The introduction of a range of 
low-mobility vehicles - a basic cargo carrier, 
with tipper, fuel tanker and recovery variants -
is proceeding according to plan. A main con-
tractor has been chosen by competitive tender for 
the production of an 8-tonne medium-mobility 
load carrier which, together with its variants, 
will form the backbone of the Army's future 
logistic fleet. 
(g) Communications. The Ptarmigan tactical. 
trunk communications system, which will replace 
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the present Bruin system, has now entered the 
final stages of development. Ptarmigan has been 
designed to conform with standards agreed in the 
communications sub-group of the Eurogroup, to 
enable future trunk systems to be fully inter-
operable. 
(h) Automatic data processing (ADP) system. 
Trials will be carried out in BAOR of a new 
command and control ADP system, WaveU. If 
these trials are successful it is planned eventually 
to equip all formation headquarters in 1 (BR) 
Corps with Wavell to assist them in data-
handling. 
(i) Logistic landing craft. Two newly-built 
logistic landing craft have been launched. 
HMA V Ardennes was commissioned in December 
last year and HMA V Arakan will be commis-
sioned in August this year. These vessels will 
provide peacetime logistic support to the Hebri-
des and logistic support for the reinforcement of 
Europe in war. 
Royal Air Force 
321. New aircraft 
(a) Tornado GR1. First deliveries of production 
aircraft, of which 150 have so far been ordered, 
are expected next year. The variable geometry 
configuration will confer great operational flexi-
bility and permit a combination of high-speed 
low-level flight, good range and an excellent 
take-off and landing performance. The tri-natio-
nal fljght test programme had amassed some 
1,500 hours by the end of 1977, and test data 
indicate that service requirements will be met. 
(b) Tornado F2. The Tornado F2 air-defence 
variant is now in full development with the first 
of three development aircraft under construction. 
It will have an excellent loiter capability and its 
armament will include Sky Flash medium-range 
and AIM9L short-range air-to-air missiles, and 
cannon. The first phase of the airborne trials of 
an important new air-intercept radar for the 
Tornado F2 has been completed and the second 
phase, to demonstrate full mission capability, 
will begin shortly. 
(c) Nimrod AEW. Full development is under 
way to convert eleven Nimrod aircraft to the 
AEW role. They will enter service progressively 
in the early 1980s, replacing the Shackleton. 
Mission system avionics will be developed and 
integrated into a modified Nimrod airframe. The 
main features of the system will be a new radar, 
electronic support measures, "identification 
friend or foe" interrogators, an integrated data-
handling system and associated communications 
equipment. The aircraft is planned to be inter-
operable to the maximum extent possible with 
other NATO airborne early warning systems. 
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(d) The Harrier/Jaguar successor. Studies of 
various designs for an· aircraft to replace the 
Harrier and Jaguar are continuing with the 
aim of combining a capability for battlefield 
attack and for air combat in one airframe. The 
possibility of developing such an aircraft col-
laboratively is being explored with a number of 
potential partners in the EPG. 
(e) Support helicopters. It is intended to meet 
the army's requirement for medium-lift helicop-
ter support by the purchase of 30 Boeing-Vertol 
CH-147 Chinook helicopters from the United 
States. The helicopters would be equipped with 
British equipment, where appropriate, to ensure 
commonality with equipment already in service 
with the Royal Air Force. At the same time a 
number of Wessex helicopters would be with-
drawn from the .front-line and transferred to 
other roles, or placed in reserve. 
(f) Sea King search and rescue helicopters. The 
first of the Sea King search and rescue helicop-
ters have been delivered to the Royal Air Force. 
They will enter service during the year and the 
Whirlwinds they replace will be withdrawn. , 
322. Aircraft in service 
(a) Nimrod maritime reconnaissance (MR) air-
craft. The major refit of Nimrod long-range 
m_aritime patro1 aircraft is now in hand and 
flight trials of the acoustic processor start this 
year. The first refitted Nimrod MR2s with the 
processor, the associated active attack and long-
range passive sonobuoys, and the Searchwater 
radar are due to enter service next year. The 
refit is to be completed by the mid-1980s. 
(b) Harrier. An order for a further 24 aircraft 
has been placed and deliveries should start next 
year. The feasibility of fitting a new improved 
wing to the aircraft is also under study. 
(c) Jaguar. Work is in hand to increase the 
take-off thrust and the time between overhauls 
of the Adour 1\Ik 102 engine. Reconnaissance 
pods containing 'British infra-red linescan and 
camera equipment ·are now being fitted. 
(d) Puma. The fleet will be progressively up-
dated by modifications to improve performance 
and extend component life, and by the intro-
duction of fibre-composite main rotor blades and 
an ice and snow protection system. Delivery of 
an advanced tactical navigation system is plan-
ned to take place this year. 
(e) Phantom. Work has begun on a programme 
to improve the combat capability of the Phantom 
to maintain a high level of operational effective-
ness until it is replaced by the Tornado F2 in 
the mid-1980s. 
323. Aircraft weapons 
(a) Air-to-air missiles. The Sky Flash medium-
range air-to-air missile, to be carried by the 
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Phantom and the 'fornado F2, is now entering 
full production. Requirements for future short-
range air-to-air missiles for the Phantom and 
Tornado F2 will be met by the procurement of 
AIM9L missiles most of which, subject to satis-
factory negotiation, will be manufactured by a 
European consortium of which the United King-
dom will be a member. 
(b) Air-to-surface weapons. Project definition 
has begun of the British Aerospace P3T anti-
ship sea-skimming missile, which will be fitted 
to the Buccaneer in the early 1980s to replace 
TV Martel and will later be carried by those 
Tornado GR1s which operate in the maritime 
strike/attack role. P3T will have a considerably 
longer range than Martel, will be guided by 
active radar to provide an all-weather day and 
night capability and will be able to penetrate 
the enemy's electronic countermeasures (ECM) 
defences. During the year American laser-guid-
ance kits to improve the accuracy of RAF 
1,000 lb high-explosive bombs and laser-
designator pods for use on Buccaneers will be 
delivered. Agreement in principle has been 
reached with the United States for the co-ope-
rative development of an advanced airfield attack 
system. Other weapons projects include studies 
of anti-armour and defence-suppression weapons, 
planned to enter ser-vice in the 1980s. 
324. Ground-based air-defence equipment 
(a) Rapier. The Rapier systems now in service 
with the RAF Regiment are being fitted with 
the blindfire tracking radar, DN 181. A study 
of further improvements is under way (see para-
graph 319(a) ). 
(b) The United Kingdom air-defence ground 
environment (UKADGE). The planned pro-
gramme of improvements to UKADGE, which is 
receiving NATO funding support, is now well 
advanced and development work will begin this 
year. Work is also in hand to re-equip a number 
of early warning stations. 
325. Other electronics 
(a) "Identification friend or foe" (IFF). Feasi-
bility studies are in progress in order to define a 
replacement IFF system with NATO-wide appli-
cation. 
(b) Communications. High-speed data commun-
ications are planned for the transfer of informa-
tion required by future command and control 
systems. Project definition has begun on the 
exchange of digital data between fighters, AEW 
aircraft, ships and UKADGE, and the feasibility 
of introducing a general purpose ground com-
munication system, using digital transmission 
and computer switching techniques, is being 
investigated. New very high frequency (VHF) 
APPENDIX III 
and ultra high frequency (UHF) airborne radio 
systems are being installed in most RAF aircraft 
to replace obsolescent equipment and to satisfy 
revised international compatibility standards ; 
new VHF and UHF ground radios are also being 
introduced. Techniques to improve beyond-line-
of-sight radio systems are being studied and the 
installation of a new HF radio groundfair net-
work for Strike Command aircraft has begun. 
The United Kingdom is co-operating closely with 
its allies to ensure that, where necessary, future 
communications systems are interoperable. 
(c) Electronic warfare. Passive radar warning 
equipment is being fitted in a variety of combat 
aircraft and active ECl\I equipment is planned 
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to be fitted in the Tornado GRl and the Jaguar 
GRl. ECM for the Harrier are also being studied. 
326. Other development programmes 
Work is continuing on improving engine 
safety, efficiency and reliability and on reducing 
costs. In order to build up experience on 
advanced technologies relevant to new aircraft 
and weapons, demonstrator programmes are 
being carried out on the use of composite mate-
rials for helicopters ; on the application of 
active control technology to enable the pilot to 
get maximum capability from the aircraft and 
allow greater freedom to the designer ; and on 
advanced air-to-air missiles. 
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Joint production - Collaborative projects as a proportion of national defence 
equipment procurement 
(a) Percentage of "procurement" head of defence budget spent on collaborative projects 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Belgium 15.6 30.6 31.1 49.4 60.6 
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.1 17.6 
n.a. = not available. 
(b) Collaborative projects to which foregoing percentages relate 
(i) Belgium 
CVRT 
Gepard (AA 35 mm) 
RITA (already approved) 
Alpha-Jet aircraft 
F-16 aircraft 
Minehunters 
(ii) United Kingdom 
Sea systems 
TynejOlympus logistic support 
Olympus gas turbine support 
Seagnat - anti-ship missile decoy system . 
NATO anti-surface ship missile 
Land systems 
CVR(T) family- tracker armoured vehicles 
SP 70 -155 mm self-propelled gun 
FH 70 - 155 mm towed gun 
Midge surveillance system 
Milan: night sight 
Air systems 
Tornado -multi-role combat aircraft 
Jaguar- strike/attack aircraft 
Puma- twin engine GP helicopter 
Gazelle- GP light helicopter 
Lynx- anti-submarine and utility helicopter 
Martel- stand-off air-to-surface guided weapon 
JP 233 - airfield attack weapon 
Long-range passive sonobuoy and sonic processor 
AUS- Australia 
BE- Belgium 
CAN- Canada 
DK- Denmark 
FR- France 
FRG - Federal Republic 
of Germany 
IT- Italy 
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NL-
NO-
UK-
US-
BE/UK 
BE/FRG 
BE/FR 
BE/FR/FRG 
BEjNLJNOJDKjUS 
BEJNL/FR 
BE/NL/UK 
FR/UK 
DK/FRG/NO/UK/US 
FR/FRG/NLJNO/UK 
BE/UK 
FRG/IT/UK 
FRG/IT/UK 
CAN/FRGjUK 
FR/FRG/UK 
FRG/IT/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
UK/US 
A US/UK 
Netherlands 
Norway 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
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Procurement, research and development, and research 
as a percentage of defence budget 
Belgium 
Fi'ance 
United Kingdom 1 
I. Range for years 1974-78. 
n.a. = not available. 
Procurement 
18% 
43% 
44.2-38.1% 
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Research and Research 
. development 
n.a. 0.06% 
10.8% 2.1% 
13.1-12.2% 1.9-1.8% 
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